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Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth
Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules
Governing Technological Surveillance
Christopher Slobogint
In Kyllo v. United States,' the Supreme Court struck a
blow for the sanctity of the home, in an age when technology
threatens to destroy it. This Article wonders whether Kyllo is a
pyrrhic victory.
Prior to Kyllo, the majority of lower courts had held that
use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat sources within a
house is not a Fourth Amendment search, either because the
heat waves detected by such devices are "abandoned" and do
not require physical intrusion to discern, or because they are
too impersonal to warrant privacy protection.2 In Kyllo, the
Supreme Court rejected these rationales, and concluded that
the government may not mechanically measure the warmth of
the home unless it demonstrates probable cause for doing so.3
The Court's decision could also be read to say that most other
scientifically enhanced investigations of the domicile are
t Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric
G. Levin College of Law. I want to thank Benjamin Diamond and Ryan Cobbs,
my research assistants, for their help on this project, and the participants in
the Minnesota Law Review's Symposium: Modem Studies in Privacy Law for
their feedback. Copyright 2002 by Christopher Slobogin and the Minnesota
Law Review.
1. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
2. Professor LaFave states that, prior to Kyllo, the "overwhelming major-
ity of appellate decisions" found that use of a thermal imager to detect items in
a home was not a search. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.2, at 74 (3d ed. Supp. 2002); see,
e.g., United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that a
thermal imager "does not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of a
home" and detects only "waste products intentionally or inevitably exposed to
the public") (in part quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988));
United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Detection of the
heat waste was not an intrusion into the home; no intimate details of the home
were observed, and there was no intrusion upon the privacy of the individuals
within.").
3. See infra text accompanying notes 77-84.
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searches as well,4 and thus might indicate a desire to put sig-
nificant restrictions on all technological surveillance of our
most private sanctuary.
If so, the ruling is a good one. But the Court left at least
one loophole in its decision, a loophole that could potentially be
quite significant. Its precise holding stated that "[w]here, as
here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance
is a 'search."'5 As the dissenters in Kyllo rightly pointed out,
varying Fourth Amendment regulation of technology on the
prevalence of that technology is troublesome, because "the
threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of in-
trusive equipment becomes more readily available."6
Much depends on how the Court defines "general public
use." One might be comforted by the majority's insistence (in-
deed, it was "quite confident"7) that, despite its availability
from over half a dozen national companies,8 the type of thermal
imaging device at issue in Kyllo is not in general use. As this
Article will document,9 however, today's marketplace offers a
wide array of much cheaper enhancement devices, easily
bought over the Internet and from nationwide chains and spe-
ciality shops. The march of progress guarantees that this trend
will accelerate. Thus, the dissent's caution in Kyllo should be
taken seriously.
The majority's sole response to this caution was the disqui-
4. See infra text accompanying notes 46-87 for the various ways the
opinion could be interpreted.
5. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 39 n.6.
8. The record in Kyllo stated that close to 1000 units of the device in that
case had been manufactured, that 4000 to 5000 units of its predecessor had
been manufactured, and that another 5000 to 6000 units were on the mar-
ket-all available for purchase or rental from "half a dozen national compa-
nies." Id. at 47 n.5; see also United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 n.6
(5th Cir. 1995) ("The [thermal imaging] technology is 'off the shelf,' having
been in general use for fifteen years.") (quoting United States v. Deaner, 1992
WL 209966, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992)). On the other hand, such imagers
can be expensive, with a cheap version, the "Thermal Viewer," costing over
$12,000, see httpJ/www.usnightvision.com, and higher resolution versions
costing between $28,000 and $50,000, with high-end versions used from heli-
copters costing over $100,000. Telephone Interview with Azar Louh, salesper-
son, FLIR Systems (Jan. 8, 2002) (FLIR stands for "Forward-Looking Infra-
Red").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 49-56.
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eting statement that the dissent's "quarrel... is not with us
but with this Court's precedent."10 Here, it cited California v.
Ciraolo," which held, in the context of airplane flyovers, that
the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment is no greater
than the privacy one can expect from the public at large-and a
decidedly curious public at that (one composed, for instance, of
members who look closely at plants growing in backyards from
low-flying airplanes). 2 If that is to be the Court's approach to
police use of technology, then the Kyllo dissent may be right in
its suggestion that the general use exception will eventually
swallow the Court's newly minted prohibition of technologically
enhanced investigation of homes. That prediction is, if any-
thing, strengthened by Ciraolo's companion case, Dow Chemi-
cal Co. v. United States.3 There, the Court held that while
"surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public"
might well require a warrant, use of a $22,000, high-
magnification mapmaking camera to surveil the exterior of se-
cluded business premises does not."
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical both involved observation of
curtilage, not the inner domain of the house. Perhaps the
Court will define "general public use" differently depending
upon the target of the surveillance, and insist that police al-
ways obtain warrants to carry out technological searches of
homes, as it did in Kyllo and in United States v. Karo,'5 which
held that use of a beeper to discover the contents of a house is a
search. But the lower courts have not let walls get in the way
of technological innovation. Several have held that observation
of the home interior using flashlights, binoculars, and other,
more sophisticated illumination and magnification devices is
not always a search. 6 Of course, binoculars and flashlights are
much more ubiquitous than the newer search enhancers. But,
as the Kyllo dissent implies, thermal imagers and beepers may
be the binoculars and flashlights of tomorrow. More impor-
10. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6.
11. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
12. Id. at 213-14 (holding that police identification of marijuana plants
from a plane 1000 feet in the air was not a search, the Court stated, "[a]ny
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed").
13. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
14. Id. at 238.
15. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
16. See infra notes 40-44.
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tantly, even the more mundane types of technology can visit
significant intrusion on home dwellers.
In this Article, I argue that the extent to which a particu-
lar technological device is used by the general public, and the
related inquiries into whether it is "generally available" or
"highly sophisticated," should be irrelevant to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. On a more fundamental level, I argue that the
Court's willingness to equate Fourth Amendment privacy with
freedom from naked eye observation, a willingness that is ap-
parent in many of the Court's cases and that is codified in
Kyllo, is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. 7 Although
the reasoning advanced here applies to all police investigative
actions, the focus of this Article will be on the use of technology
to investigate goings-on inside the home and similarly private
locations. I treat use of technology to conduct surveillance of
public areas in a sequel article. 8
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the law regarding
both the general public use doctrine and what I will call the
"naked eye doctrine" as they are described in Kyllo, other Su-
preme Court decisions, and the lower courts. Part II explains
why these concepts are incoherent in practice and unsustain-
able in theory. Part III proposes two solutions to the problems
posed by technological searches. The first is based on my pre-
vious work arguing for adoption of a proportionality principle,
which dictates that "search" be defined broadly for Fourth
Amendment purposes (so that any intentional surveillance of a
house would require some suspicion), but also permits police to
search on less than probable cause when their actions are not
particularly intrusive. ' The second proposal is that Congress
enact a statute prohibiting use of technological devices under
circumstances analogous to those currently encapsulated in Ti-
tle III with respect to eavesdropping instruments.0
The first proposal might strike some as a non-starter,
given the Court's niggardly search jurisprudence on the one
17. Thus, although I agree with many of his criticisms of the Court's
cases, I disagree with Professor Ku's suggestion, expressed in this symposium
issue of Minnesota Law Review, that observation of the home with technology
in general public use or with the naked eye is not governed by the Fourth
Amendment. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies After Kyllo, 86 MINN. L. REV., 1325 (2002).
18. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Technological Surveillance
and the Right to Anonymity, MISS. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 153-80.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 181-94.
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hand,2' and its apparent insistence, on the other hand, that
those actions that are denominated searches be based on prob-
able cause.22 But the Court has yet to define reasonable expec-
tations of privacy in connection with technologically enhanced
house searches, so it is not too late to adopt an expansive view
of "search" in this particular context. As for the probable cause
dogma, the lower courts, which have to deal with the run-of-
the-mill case on a daily basis, have often ignored it, something
the Supreme Court has come close to doing as well.2"
If the proportionality approach is viewed as too radical, the
second proposal is offered as a worthy substitute. Generally,
that proposal would criminalize non-consensual technological
surveillance of home interiors and similar locations by civilians.
If that law goes into effect, visual surveillance devices would
never lawfully be in "general use" for the purpose of spying on
homes and the like, and that reality would in turn render the
general public use exception as applied to private areas irrele-
vant, even as technology becomes more prevalent.
I. THE GENERAL PUBLIC USE AND NAKED EYE
EXCEPTIONS
The general public use doctrine is of ephemeral origins.
Perhaps as a result, its scope is very imprecise. Also unclear is
how it interacts with other factors relevant to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, including the naked eye exception. These three
matters are explored below.
A. GENESIS
Until the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment protected against
government trespass in any of the four areas named in the
Fourth Amendment-houses, persons, papers, and effects.24
21. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, §2.1(d), at 394 (3d ed. 1996) ("Too often
the Court has failed to appreciate that privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all, and that there is a dramatic difference, in
privacy terms, between revealing bits and pieces of information sporadically to
a small and often select group for a limited purpose and a focused police ex-
amination of the totality of that information regarding a particular individ-
ual.") (citation omitted).
22. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) ("A dwelling-place search,
no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause.. .
23. See infra text accompanying notes 172-79.
24. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961) (noting that the
crux of the Court's search cases up to that time was whether the police inves-
tigation was "accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical encroach-
2002] 1397
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Under that approach, the prevalence of technology the police
used was irrelevant. The sole inquiry was whether operation of
the technology required intrusion into a protected area. If so, a
search occurred; if not, then the Fourth Amendment was not
implicated.2
Katz v. United States 6 supposedly changed all that. In
Katz, the Court held that police bugging of a phone booth is a
search. Even though a phone booth is not a house, person, pa-
per, or effect, and even though the bugging device did not
physically intrude into it, the Court concluded that Katz's
Fourth Amendment interests were infringed by the police ac-
tion.27 Justice Harlan's suggestion, in his concurring opinion,28
that the Fourth Amendment protects expectations of privacy
"that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' has be-
come the most prominent explanation for this result, as well as
the guiding principle of search and seizure law more gener-
ally.2-9 But Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz contains
many pithy phrases that continue to be cited as well. The most
prominent of these, for purposes of exploring the general public
use doctrine and its relationship to surveillance of homes, is his
statement that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the pub-
lic, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."0
In Ciraolo, the Supreme Court relied on that formulation
in concluding that naked eye observation, from an airplane fly-
ing at 1000 feet, of a backyard surrounded by a ten-foot high
fence is not a search.3' In context, the Court's use of this aspect
of Katz is instructive:
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been ex-
tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact
ment within a constitutionally protected area").
25. Compare id. at 509 (holding a search occurred because the "spike
mike" used by police touched a part of the defendant's house), with Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that wiretapping was not a
search because there was "no entry of the houses and offices of the defen-
dants").
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. See id. at 351-52.
28. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 2.1(b), at 384 ("Lower courts attempting
to interpret and apply Katz quickly came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration,
as ultimately did a majority of the Supreme Court.... .") (citation omitted).
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
31. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).
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that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his
activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage
point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities
clearly visible.... "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection."
The observations... in this case took place within public naviga-
ble airspace, in a physically nonintrusive manner .... Any member of
the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed. On this record, we readily
conclude that respondent's expectation that his garden was protected
from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that
society is prepared to honor.32
The Court used the same reasoning in Florida v. Riley,33
where it held that observing a backyard from a helicopter, this
time only 400 feet about the ground (but still in navigable air-
space), is not a search.34 In both cases, the Court assumed that
members of the public might engage in the type of behavior the
police did, and reasoned from that assumption that the behav-
ior did not offend reasonable expectations of privacy.
In neither Ciraolo or Riley did the Court focus on the fact
that the police were using technology (aircraft) to carry out
their observations. In Ciraolo, however, the Court did state
that "[in an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally pro-
tected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude
of 1,000 feet.3 5 It was this sentence that the Court would later
cite in Kyllo in support of its general public use exception to
technological surveillance of the home.
Although a companion case to Ciraolo, Dow Chemical's
contribution to the general public use exception was formulated
somewhat differently. In finding that the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's use of a $22,000 mapmaking camera to photo-
graph Dow Chemical's plant was not a search,37 the Court fo-
32. Id. at 213-14 (citations omitted).
33. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
34. Id. at 451 ("Any member of the public could legally have been flying
over Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have
observed Riley's greenhouse.").
35. 476 U.S. at 215.
36. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,39 n.6 (2001).
37. The lower court found that the camera used to view Dow's plant "cost
in excess of $22,000.00." Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 242
n.4 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Dow Chem. Co.,
536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1982)).
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cused on the camera's availability and capabilities rather than
its prevalence. Again, the relevant language is worth looking at
in context.
It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of pri-
vate property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment
not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology,
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant. But the photo-
graphs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise consti-
tutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give EPA more de-
tailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited to an
outline of the facility's buildings and equipment. The mere fact that
human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does
not give rise to constitutional problems.'
This language, like the opinion in Ciraolo, makes clear that
the extent to which the public has access to given technology is
only one of many considerations in the Fourth Amendment cal-
culus. More will be said about this multi-factor approach be-
low.3 9 For now, it is enough to observe that the foregoing cases
represent the sum total of the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments on the general public use concept. On this score, the
lineage from Katz to Kyllo is thin indeed.
The lower courts, in contrast, provide many pre-Kyllo ex-
amples of judicial reliance on the general public use rationale.
For instance, in State v. Vogel, the court held that police use of
a camera with a zoom lens to photograph the interior of a resi-
dence was not a search, in part because there was "no showing
that the cameras and lenses used [were] sophisticated visual
aids" or "special equipment not generally in use.'4° In State v.
Rose, the court concluded that use of a flashlight to aid peering
into a mobile home is not a search in part because a flashlight
is "an exceedingly common device."41 Several cases have used
the same kind of language in concluding that no search occurs
when police use zoom or other magnification lenses to observe
curtilage.
42
38. Id. at 238.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 63-87.
40. 428 N.W.2d 272, 275 (S.D. 1988).
41. 909 P.2d 280, 286 (Wash. 1996).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 463 (9th Cir.
1995) ("A 35 mm camera with a 600 mm lens is a kind of vision enhancer
commonly available to the public and used typically for telephoto landscape
photography."); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980)
(use of a special lens is not a search because "[sluch equipment is widely
available commercially"); State v. Lange, 463 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) ("We specifically limit our holding here to approval of the use of stan-
dard binoculars and cameras equipped with generally available standard and
1400 [Vol.86:1393
PEEPING TECHNO-TOMS
A number of other decisions have permitted enhanced ob-
servation of home interiors or curtilage-using devices ranging
from binoculars to startrons (which are essentially night scopes
with magnification capacity)-without specifically mentioning
the general public use concept. But they either have clearly as-
sumed that such visual enhancement does not change the
Fourth Amendment analysis,43 or have noted that the use of
more sophisticated devices might have changed the result.
44
Thus, the routine use and general availability notions briefly
alluded to in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical have heavily influ-
zoom lenses.").
43. See, e.g., People v. Ferguson, 365 N.E.2d 77, 79 (IM. App. Ct. 1977)
(use of binoculars to look through the windows of a second floor apartment
from 60 feet away); People v. Hicks, 364 N.E.2d 440, 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)
(use of night binoculars to look in a hotel room window at 1:00 a.m.); State v.
Littleton, 407 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (La. 1981) (use of binoculars to look into a
hangar with a thirty- to forty-foot wide opening); People v. Ward, 308 N.W.2d
664, 667 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (observation through a telephoto lens to look in
a home); State v. Thompson, 241 N.W.2d 511, 512 (Neb. 1976) (use of binocu-
lars to look into house windows); State v. Louis, 672 P.2d 708, 709 (Or. 1983)
(use of a telephoto lens to observe a person repeatedly positioning self at win-
dow); Commonwealth v. Williams, 396 A.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979) (use of binoculars and startron to look in a home); Commonwealth v.
Hernley, 263 A.2d 904, 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (use of binoculars to look into
printing shop); State v. Manly, 530 P.2d 306, 307 (Wash. 1975) (use of binocu-
lars to look into a home). The Supreme Court has made statements consistent
with these holdings, albeit in cases involving targets outside the home. See
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (stating that "the use of artificial
means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search" in
the context of a car search); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952)
(stating that "[tihe use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope to magnify the
object of a witness' vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if they fo-
cus without his knowledge or consent upon what one supposes to be private
indiscretions" in the context of shining a searchlight on a boat). But see
United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980) (use of binoculars
to look in a home deemed a search); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252,
1257-58 (D. Haw. 1976) (same); People v. Arno, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (same).
44. See, e.g., People v. Oynes, 920 P.2d 880, 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)
("Absent evidence in the record indicating that the deputy's binoculars were
extraordinarily powerful, we conclude that the observation [of a house] was
not a "search" for constitutional purposes."); Bernstiel v. State, 416 So. 2d 827,
828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that the use of binoculars to look in a
greenhouse is not a search because "the emphasis appears to be on the danger
imposed by more sophisticated devices such as telescopes"); State v. Stachler,
570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Haw. 1977) (stating that the use of binoculars to look in
a backyard is not a search but "[i]f the lower court had found... that highly
sophisticated viewing devices had been employed, we might well decide differ-
ently").
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enced the lower courts.45
B. DEFINITIONS
Despite the number of cases mentioning the issue, the gen-
eral public use concept remains amorphous. As noted above, a
number of courts seem to believe that flashlights and binocu-
lars, and perhaps night scopes as well, are in general public
use. The Supreme Court has indicated that airplanes (in navi-
gable airspace) and mapmaking cameras are as well, but that
thermal imagers and (probably) beepers are not. But no court
has put forth a more general definition of the concept. Given
the Supreme Court's use of the term in Kyllo, that effort will
probably soon be forthcoming. In the meantime, the thumbnail
sketch of the caselaw provided above suggests three basic defi-
nitions, each of which is itself divisible into two or more ver-
sions.
The first basic definition focuses on whether the technology
in question is "generally available to the public"--the language
found in Dow Chemical. "Generally" means "usually" or "as a
rule,"5 while "general" means "applicable to the whole."7
"Available" means "accessible" or "obtainable," or "ready for
immediate use."" On these understandings, a generally avail-
able item is one that all or virtually all members of the public
are able to obtain. Taken literally, this definition would ex-
clude much surveillance technology, except perhaps the cheap-
est flashlights. It would certainly not encompass mapmaking
cameras or low-flying airplanes, suggesting that this is not the
definition the Court would endorse.
Moving to a broader definition (although still not as broad
as Dow Chemical's), general availability could be construed to
mean that the item is available to a substantial portion of the
public. Under this definition, indicia of general availability
might be the number of items manufactured, the cost of the
45. In his survey of the caselaw, Professor LaFave lists "the level of
sophistication of the equipment utilized by the police" as one of "two primary
considerations" relevant to "assessing in a particular case whether [an] expec-
tation [of privacy in the home] was in fact justified." 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2,
at 421. The other consideration is "the extent to which the incriminating ob-
jects or actions were out of the line of normal sight from contiguous areas
where passersby or others might be." Id.
46. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 478 (1973).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 77.
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item, and the number of outlets carrying it. More colloquially,
this definition could be dubbed the 'Wal-Mart test." If the item
is available at Wal-Mart, it is likely to be affordable to and ac-
cessible by a large segment of the public.
Clearly flashlights are generally available in this sense.
They are usually inexpensive (a high-beam version comes as
low as $8.00, batteries included), and can be purchased at na-
tionwide stores such as Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target, as well
as numerous local stores.49 Binoculars are not as prevalent, but
are still relatively cheap, ranging from $9.00 for a pair with a
magnification capacity of 4 (4x) to $55.00 for binoculars with
12x power."' Cameras equipped with zoom lenses are also
fairly easy to purchase, with Wal-Mart prices ranging from
$60.00 to $100.00 for cameras with 2x to 4x magnification
power.!1 This much is common knowledge.
What might be somewhat surprising is that Wal-Mart also
offers inexpensive versions of highly powerful telescopes and
night vision equipment. The Tasco Luminova Telescope costs
only $59.87 and has a magnification power of 578.52 The Night
Owl Light Night Vision Monocular costs only $129.87, has in-
frared capacity, and has a magnification power of 3.1x.53
Moving from Wal-Mart to speciality stores, one encounters
a veritable cornucopia of inexpensive surveillance goodies.
These include cheap five-power binoculars, with night vision up
to 50 feet (for only $11.95!)5 to state-of-the-art night vision
scopes starting at under $200.00. 55 These devices may not be in
49. This assertion is based on a recent shopping trip taken by the Author.
Prices of these or similar items can also be found at http'//www.walmart.com.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See www.pgtechnologies.com (last visited June 15, 2002); see also
www.wildplanet.com ("Spynight Scope" features "green tinted lenses [that] aid
night-time surveillance"; secret agents need only "press a button and the
stealth green spotlight pops up to shine as far as 25 feet away!") (last visited
June 15, 2002).
55. See, e.g., httpJ/www.binoculars.com/model.asp?PID=5713 (featuring
the Bushnell Compact Monocular, with 1.7x magnification and an "[i]nfrared
illuminator for viewing in complete darkness" for $149.00) (last visited Feb. 2,
2002). For under $250.00, one can also purchase receivers that will surrepti-
tiously pick up the signals sent by "nanny-cameras" and other security-
oriented video surveillance, allowing "eyesdroppers" to see the insides of
homes and businesses unbeknownst to those who set up the cameras. John
Schwartz, Nanny-Cam May Leave a Home Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,2002,
at 1.
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every home, but they are certainly much more "available" to
the general public than seats on airplanes, and much less so-
phisticated than the $22,000 mapmaking camera in Dow
Chemical.
A second, less expansive basic definition of the general
public use concept adheres more closely to the words in that
phrase: How often does the public use a particular type of tech-
nology? Generally available items may not be commonly re-
sorted to. For instance, although most of the aforementioned
devices are obtainable by a sizeable portion of the public, their
use is quite varied; people rely on flashlights all the time, bin-
oculars and zoom lenses somewhat less frequently, and tele-
scopes and night vision equipment less frequently still.
At the same time, all of these items are everyday para-
phernalia to certain segments of the population, and are relied
upon at least as frequently as low-flying airplanes in carrying
out certain types of endeavors. Birdwatchers, sports fans, and
hunters make avid use of binoculars. Tourists and loving fami-
lies focus their zoom lenses on a daily basis. Telescopes are a
favorite of stargazers, and night vision devices are popular with
hunters. The number of these groupings and their size will
only expand as time marches on.16 Also worth noting is the
Court's apparent endorsement of this "subgroup" approach to
the general use doctrine in Dow Chemical, where it emphasized
that the device relied on in that case was "a conventional, albeit
56. With respect to night vision equipment, consider this excerpt from the
introduction to a report on use of visual surveillance devices:
The current "Gen HI" or Third Generation night vision devices have
become much less expensive, more reliable, and more widespread in
nonmilitary use.... [Visual surveillance technologies once reserved
solely for military or police use, such as night vision devices, have
been dramatically reduced in price, and are entering the civilian
market in ever increasing numbers.... [Als microminiaturization of
these technologies proceeds, the presence of surveillance devices in
our daily lives is becoming ever more pervasive, and increasingly
without our knowledge or awareness.... [Bly 2004, it can be expected
that growth in the visual surveillance device market will result in
mergers and acquisitions in the security industry that depends on
these devices.... [Tihe visual surveillance device industry is a
growth industry, which will see substantial growth in industrial,
commercial and residential applications well into the next century,
with a consequent eroding of personal privacy.
George Sameijan, Visual Surveillance Devices: New Opportunities (May 2000),
available at http'//www.buscom.com/safety/G241.html. The full report, which
predicts market trends with respect to night vision and closed circuit TV, costs
$3450.00. See id.
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precise, commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking."57
That observation leads to a third basic definition that is
even narrower-general public use for a particular purpose.
Most of these devices, even if generally available and used by
large segments of the public, are not usually used the way po-
lice use them. In particular, they are probably not normally
employed to look into homes or curtilage.
As the Court demonstrated in Riley, there are several ver-
sions of this approach as well. A plurality of justices in that
case (including Justice Scalia, author of Kyllo) adopted what
might be called a "positivist" approach, finding the fact that
planes could legally fly within 400 feet of the ground dispositive
of the issue of whether observation of curtilage from that height
was a search. 8 This stance, as the Riley dissent pointed out, in
essence asserts that "the expectation of privacy is defeated if a
single member of the public could conceivably position herself
to see into the area in question without doing anything ille-
gal."59
The other five Justices took an "empirical" approach to that
issue. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, concluded
that if overflights at 400 feet are "rare," then they should be
considered searches even though technically in navigable air-
space (although she ended up deciding they were not rare in
this particular area, and thus joined the plurality in finding
that no search occurred in Riley).60 The four dissenters in Riley
fine-tuned the empirical approach fuirther, asking whether
overflights at 400 feet for the specific purpose of observing the
contents of residential backyards are rare, 1 and deciding that
57. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,238 (1986).
58. The dissent asserted that, according to the majority, "it is the FAA
regulations rather than any empirical inquiry that is determinative," a char-
acterization that seems accurate. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 461 n.5
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 457.
60. Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because there is reason to be-
lieve that there is considerable public use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet
and above, and because Riley introduced no evidence to the contrary before the
Florida courts, I conclude that Riley's expectation that his curtilage was pro-
tected from naked-eye aerial observation from that altitude was not a reason-
able one.").
61. Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Ste-
vens, stated that "[tihe question before us must be not whether the police were
where they had a right to be, but whether public observation of Riley's curti-
lage was so commonplace that Riley's expectation of privacy in his backyard
could not be considered reasonable." Id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Jus-
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they were exceedingly so.62
C. INTERACTION WITH OTHER FACTORS
In addition to the definitional ambiguity, another potential
source of confusion about the general public use doctrine is that
it is only one of many factors possibly relevant to the search is-
sue. For instance, after Dow Chemical, aiming a mapmaking
camera from an airplane is not a search if the target is business
curtilage, but, as the Court suggested in Dow Chemical, it may
become a search if the interior of the home is the focus.' Shin-
ing a flashlight in a car windows or the open door of barn situ-
ated in open fields" may be treated differently than use of that
device to look into a bedroom window.
In other work, I have identified seven factors the courts of-
ten look at in determining whether police use of technology is a
search. In addition to the availability of the technology to the
general public, courts consider six other factors: (1) the nature
of the place to be observed; (2) the steps taken to enhance pri-
vacy; (3) the degree to which the surveillance requires a physi-
cal intrusion onto private property; (4) the nature of the object
or activity observed; (5) the extent to which the technology en-
hances the natural senses; and (6) the extent to which the sur-
veillance is unnecessarily pervasive, invasive, or disruptive
(i.e., steps taken by the police to minimize the intrusion).66
tice Blackmun, who wrote a separate dissent, similarly stated that "answering
[the search] question depends upon whether Riley has a 'reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy' that no such surveillance would occur, and does not depend
upon the fact that the helicopter was flying at a lawful altitude under FAA
regulations." Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I think we could take judicial no-
tice that, while there may be an occasional privately owned helicopter that
flies over populated areas at an altitude of 400 feet, such flights are a rarity
and are almost entirely limited to approaching or leaving airports or to report-
ing traffic congestion near major roadways."). Justice Blackmun agreed: "I
believe that private helicopters rarely fly over curtilages at an altitude of 400
feet," but concluded that the case should be remanded to permit the prosecu-
tion to show the rarity of such flights. Id. at 468 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
63. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) ("We
find it important that [the area surveilled] is not an area immediately adjacent
to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.").
64. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (holding that looking
into the interior of a car with the aid of a flashlight is not a search).
65. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (holding that
looking into the interior of a barn outside the curtilage with the aid of a flash-
light is not a search).
66. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance:
[Vol.86:13931406
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Ciraolo, Riley, and Dow Chemical can be used to illustrate
each of these six factors. With respect to the nature of the area
surveilled, all three cases emphasized that the home and im-
mediate surrounding curtilage are accorded the most signifi-
cant privacy protection." On the issue of privacy enhancement,
Ciraolo noted that the ten-foot high fence in that case, although
clearly meant to shield the backyard from street-level viewing,
would not have barred observers on trucks or busses from see-
ing the marijuana,6 and in Dow Chemical, the Court scoffed at
Dow's assertion that keeping track of the identification num-
bers of overflights was an adequate precaution against privacy
invasion.69 All three cases also emphasized that the overflight
did not require physical intrusion onto the property.0
Concerning the nature of the activity observed, the major-
ity opinions in Dow Chemical and Riley asserted that the heli-
copter observers did not see any "intimate" activities in the
backyard.7' With respect to the potency of the enhancement
used, Dow Chemical distinguished the camera observation in
that case from technological observation that can see through
The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 383, 389-98 (1997).
67. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (referring to the home
and curtilage as the area "where privacy expectations are most heightened");
Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (noting that "no intimate details connected with the use
of the home or curtilage were observed"); Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 237 n.4 ("We
find it important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private
home, where privacy expectations are most heightened."). It is interesting to
note, however, that none of these cases made a distinction between the home
and the curtilage in terms of privacy protection.
68. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 ("Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these
plants from the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck
or a two-level bus.").
69. Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 237 n.4 ("Simply keeping track of the identifi-
cation numbers of any planes flying overhead, with a later follow-up to see if
photographs were taken, does not constitute a 'procedur[e] designed to protect
the facility from aerial photography.'").
70. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (noting that the observations by the police
"took place... in a physically nonintrusive manner"); Riley, 488 U.S. at 452
("Neither is there any intimation here that the helicopter interfered with re-
spondent's normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage.");
Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 237 ("Any actual physical entry by EPA into any en-
closed area would raise significantly different questions ....").
71. Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (noting that "no intimate details connected with
the use of the home or curtilage were observed"); Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at
238 (noting that "the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details
as to raise constitutional concerns").
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walls.72 And on the issue of minimization, Riley noted that the
helicopter caused "no undue noise" nor any "wind, dust, or
threat of injury."73
Lower courts dealing with technologically enhanced
searches of homes mention similar factors. The most fre-
quently noted are steps taken to enhance privacy (were cur-
tains drawn, fences erected?) and the vantage point of the ob-
server (was he in public space, or private space into which the
public is explicitly or implicitly invited?).74 But no particular
factor is ascribed priority in the analysis.
Given the numerous variables that courts consider in as-
sessing reasonable expectations of privacy, how important is
the general public use factor when assessing the Fourth
Amendment implications of enhanced observation of the home,
the subject of Kyllo (and this Article)? Kyllo suggests that,
whatever may have been the case in the past, it is very impor-
tant to the current Court in that particular setting. Further,
Kyllo suggests that most, if not all, of the other factors (that is,
factors (2) through (6) above) are of secondary importance or
are entirely irrelevant in deciding whether such observation is
a Fourth Amendment search. While affirming that the "inte-
rior of the home" is accorded full Fourth Amendment protec-
tion,75 and twice stating the general public use exception to that
rule,76 the decision implicitly or explicitly downplays at least
four of the other five factors identified above.
To verify this point, consider Kyllo's treatment of each fac-
tor, in the same order as above, beginning with steps taken to
enhance privacy. On this issue, the Kyllo majority was the
most opaque, for it did not directly address the dissent's point
that the defendant could have avoided the discovery of the heat
waves by "mak[ing] sure that the surrounding area [was] well
insulated."77 Perhaps the majority did not think the matter
important enough to address, or perhaps (as explained below)
this factor still does remain crucial. In contrast, the majority
72. 476 U.S. at 239 ("An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows
so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other
trade secrets would raise very different and far more serious questions....").
The Court also distinguished the photography in Dow Chemical from satellite
photography. Id. at 238.
73. 488 U.S. at 452.
74. See cases cited supra note 43.
75. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 39 (2001).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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forthrightly dismissed the dissent's argument that the imager
"did not penetrate the walls of petitioner's home,"78 stating,
"[w]e rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up
only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone
booth."79 To the assertion that the thermal imager detected no
intimate details,80 the majority once again minced no words: "In
the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, be-
cause the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes."" And the dissent's attempt to show-through its obser-
vations about the various other ways the heat inside Kyllo's
home could have been detected 2-- that the imager merely repli-
cated what careful unenhanced surveillance would have dis-
cerned was "quite irrelevant" to the majority.83 The majority
continued:
The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by
other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the
Fourth Amendment. The police might, for example, learn how many
people are in a particular house by setting up year-round surveil-
lance; but that does not make breaking and entering to find out the
same information lawful. In any event, on the night of January 16,
1992 [the date of the surveillance], no outside observer could have
discerned the relative heat of Kyllo's home without thermal imaging.8
Although the final variable-concerning steps taken to
minimize the surveillance-was left unaddressed by the Kyllo
majority, presumably that factor too is "irrelevant" when the
78. Id. at 44-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the imager did not
"penetrate" the walls and that "[w]hat was involved in this case was nothing
more than drawing inferences from off-the-wall surveillance, rather than any
'through-the-wall' surveillance").
79. Id. at 35.
80. Id. at 37 (noting that "[t]he Government also contends that the ther-
mal imaging was constitutional because it did not 'detect private activities oc-
curring in private areas'"); see also id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the imager "did not obtain 'any information regarding the interior of the
home'").
81. Id. at 37.
82. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or
passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, particularly if
it is vented, as was the case here. Additionally, any member of the
public might notice that one part of a house is warmer than another
part or a nearby building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or
snow melts at different rates across its surfaces.
Id.
83. Id. at 35 n.2.
84. Id.
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surveillance is of the home. If all activities therein are inti-
mate, then no amount of minimization suffices.
Before concluding, however, that general public use is the
only factor relevant to deciding whether sense-enhanced sur-
veillance of the home is a search, look one more time at the
holding in Kyllo: "Where, as here, the Government uses a de-
vice that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search'.... ." In an
earlier phrasing of its holding, the Court stated, "We think that
obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information re-
garding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area' constitutes a search-at least where (as here)
the technology in question is not in general public use.""6 The
italicized portions of these statements, taken together, an-
nounce that if the activity observed could be seen with the na-
ked eye without physical intrusion into the constitutionally
protected areas of home or curtilage, then police may exploit
any technology-generally used or not-without implicating
the Fourth Amendment (whereas, as we have been discussing,
if the activity cannot be viewed with the naked eye in the ab-
sence of physical intrusion, the police may only use common
technology to conduct warrantless enhanced surveillance).
This second exception to the general prohibition on en-
hanced surveillance of the home interior-what I am calling
the "naked eye" exception-suggests that at least one other fac-
tor besides general public use is still important in assessing
enhanced home observation. Steps taken to enhance privacy,
such as drawing curtains over windows or fencing off one's
yard, may continue to be relevant after Kyllo because they cur-
tail naked eye observation of the interior of the home from out-
side the house. In the absence of such steps, naked eye viewing
without physical intrusion is more likely, in which case Kyllo
allows police use of any technology available to view the same
details.
After Kyllo, the determination of whether technologically
enhanced surveillance of the interior of the home is a search
depends on two factors: whether the technology is in general
85. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961)) (emphasis added).
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public use and, if it is not, whether the technologically en-
hanced surveillance detects only details that would have been
viewable without technology, from an area unprotected by the
Constitution. If either the general public use or the naked eye
exception applies, then no search has occurred. It is now time
to examine whether any of this makes sense.
II. KYLLO'S PROBLEMS
To the extent it endorses the general public use concept or
the related idea that details viewable by the naked eye without
physical intrusion also may be viewed with technology, the rul-
ing in Kyllo is seriously flawed. This Part demonstrates that
conclusion from three perspectives. The first is the most prag-
matic: Both the general public use and the naked eye doctrines
are virtually impossible to apply in a meaningful manner. The
second perspective is more theoretical: Despite the courts' in-
sinuation to the contrary, these two concepts cannot, as a logi-
cal matter, flow from Katz's "knowing exposure" language. The
third perspective is blatantly normative: Members of our soci-
ety should be constitutionally entitled to expect that govern-
ment will refrain from any spying on the home-technological
or otherwise-unless it can demonstrate good cause for doing
SO.
A. THE PuBLIC USE/NAKED EYE QUAGMIRES
I have already indicated the numerous possible mean-
ings of "general public use." There are at least three broad
definitions of that phrase (general availability, general use, and
general use for a particular purpose) and each of those defini-
tions can be subdivided into alternative definitions that vary
widely. For instance, interpreting "general" to mean "of the
whole," the general availability rubric might cover only the
most common devices (such as flashlights or binoculars). In its
"Wal-Mart" guise, however, it could also encompass zoom cam-
eras, night vision equipment, and telescopes. Alternatively, if
one takes Dow Chemical's use of the term seriously, then even
87. A caveat to this conclusion is that Kyllo rejected the four factors dis-
cussed above only in connection with home searches that do not use generally
available technology. Thus, when police looking into a home rely on technol-
ogy in general public use, the Court might still call the action a Fourth
Amendment search if what is viewed is "intimate," the technology replicates
more than could be seen through unenhanced viewing, or one of the other fac-
tors is implicated.
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$22,000 mapmaking cameras qualify. In contrast, the general
use rubric, in its narrowest version, might not even include
binoculars, because that item is probably not routinely used by
most of the population. But "general use" could also fairly be
construed to include that device, as well as any other device
used by a large subgroup of the population (including airplanes
and zoom cameras).
The general use for a particular purpose definition, al-
though ostensibly the narrowest of the three, could still encom-
pass many devices-or it could exclude all of them, depending
upon whether a positivist or empirical approach is taken, and
on which "purpose" is at issue. As a matter of positive law, use
of binoculars and flashlights on the public thoroughfares is
permissible; thus, if one were to follow the plurality's approach
in Riley (which apparently considered curtilage viewing from
any flight within navigable airspace near an air-lane to be "rou-
tine")," such use might not be a search even if it happened to
disclose activities inside the home. As an empirical matter,
however, people may seldom use public vantage points to peer
into other people's homes, and fewer still use binoculars or
flashlights, much less more sophisticated equipment, to do so;
one could probably say such instances are "rare." Under the
narrowest definition of general public use (for a particular pur-
pose), even home observation aided by the most widely adopted
forms of "technology"-eyeglasses, for instance-might thus
constitute a search.
In short, the possible permutations of the general public
use doctrine are myriad and perhaps overwhelming. To this
problem, which admittedly besets other legal doctrines as well,
is added the vexing quandary alluded to by the Kyllo dissent:
How are the courts to deal with the rapid pace of technological
development in deciding whether something is in general pub-
lic use? Although the Court has declared that thermal imagers
do not fit in this category, it may have to change its stance in
the future, given the increasing reliance on such devices.8 9
Night vision equipment, although also relatively new, is even
more ubiquitous and much less expensive,90 and will raise per-
88. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
89. Today, thermal imaging devices are relied upon fairly routinely by a
large number of groups, including firefighters, doctors making diagnoses, and
those engaged in maritime navigation, maintenance of electrical apparatus,
product development and industrial production quality assurance. See
www.flir.com (last visited April 12, 2002).
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plexing questions as well. If a declaration that these items are
in general public use is hard to imagine, consider that the zoom
camera-a device that at least two courts have considered gen-
erally available91-- did not come into being until 1986.92 Ad-
vanced technology can find its way in to the average home very
quickly.93 When that happens with devices such as nightscopes
and beepers (and perhaps thermal imagers?), the courts will ei-
ther have to change their stance, manipulate the meaning of
the general public use doctrine, or ignore it. None of these op-
tions is very palatable, either as an institutional matter (for
courts used to following precedent), or as a policy matter (for
police, litigants, and citizens trying to organize their affairs).
Conscientious courts will also be flummoxed by Kyllo's po-
sition on police use of technology that is not in general public
use. Here they must determine whether the details seen with
technology would also have been viewable with the naked eye
without physically intruding into a constitutionally protected
area. The first conundrum raised by this formulation is its in-
herently paradoxical nature. If naked eye viewing without
physical intrusion could have occurred, why didn't it? If the
answer is (and it usually will be) that the police were worried
they would be discovered, thus leading the targets to stop what
they were doing or to hide it better, then the interior details
could not have been seen with the naked eye. In other words,
Kyllo's naked eye formulation will often create an investigative
catch-22: Either naked eye observation is possible without de-
tection,9 in which case enhancement devices are not needed, or
90. Compare cost figures for thermal imagers, supra note 8, with cost fig-
ures for night vision equipment, supra note 55.
91. See supra note 42.
92. KErIH WILSON, PHOTOGRAPHY 10 (1994).
93. At one time, of course, even flashlights and binoculars were new on
the market. But within a very short time, they became widely available to the
public. See Invention of the Flashlight, at http://inventors.about.com/
library/inventors/blflashlight.htm (noting that the flashlight was invented in
1898 and was being heavily advertised the next year) (last visited Mar. 9,
2002); Peter Abrahams, The Early History of the Binocular, at
http//home.europa.com-telscope/binohist.txt (stating that the first high qual-
ity modern binoculars were sold in 1894) (last visited Mar. 9, 2002); Peter
Abrahams, U.S. Army Binoculars: WWI, at http//home.europa.com/
~telscope/milusarm.txt (explaining that by World War I over 100,000 binocu-
lars were bought by the U.S. Army alone) (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
94. Sometimes enhancement devices might be used not because they
avoid detection but because they cost less than naked eye observation (e.g.,
naked eye observation that would have required an elaborate deception, such
as officers posing as telephone line repair people). If so, the catch-22 is
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the details are not observable in that manner, in which case
enhancement is not permissible. The Court probably did not
intend that result. Assuming so, it has left courts with the
puzzles of determining the extent to which fear of detection
should be factored into the analysis, and how to discern
whether that fear existed.
Putting this problem aside would not end the difficulties
associated with the Court's ruling. Again, that ruling holds
that enhanced searches of the home are permissible if they
merely duplicate naked eye searches from vantage points that
are not constitutionally protected. Many imponderables will
surely arise in making this determination. Is the curtilage al-
ways a constitutionally protected area? What if it "invites" the
public onto it with sidewalks and similar arrangements? Do
apartment buildings have curtilage? Assuming the hypothetical
naked eye viewing could take place without physical intrusion
on a protected area, are there any other restrictions on how it
could occur? Can it be hypothesized that police would have
climbed trees, peered through cracks, and looked between half-
drawn curtains in determining whether the naked eye would
have spied the activities actually observed with the enhance-
ment device?
Lower courts have already had trouble grappling with
these types of questions in dealing with actual naked eye view-
ing of the interior of the home. Although virtually all courts
hold that looking through an open door or window from a public
vantage point is not a search, 5 in other situations one court's
sufficiency of precaution is another court's complete failure to
take adequate steps to protect privacy. Cases often come down
to whether curtilage is secluded enough, a fence high enough, a
avoided, but the second problem with the naked eye exception, discussed fur-
ther below, is not-how is a court to assess whether this more costly operation
would have occurred and what it would have allowed the police to see? En-
hancement devices might also be used to "confirm" naked eye observation.
See, e.g., State v. Holbron, 648 P.2d 194, 197 (Haw. 1982) (finding no search
where binoculars are used only to confirm unaided observations). In this type
of case, however, the enhanced observation sees more detail than the naked
eye; otherwise, "confirmation" wouldn't be necessary. See Robert C. Power,
Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed Formulation for Visual
Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 49-50 (1989) (objecting that in
cases like Holbron "objects that officials can see but not fully identify without
enhancement are treated as if they were in full public view").
95. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 2.3(c), at 480 (observing that "the
prevailing rule" is that using the senses to investigate the interior of a
residence from a lawful vantage point is not a search).
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curtain drawn enough, or a crack in the door small enough.9 6
Because it requires courts to speculate whether a hypothetical
naked eye could have lawfully observed what the enhanced
viewing detected in such circumstances, Kyllo's formulation
profoundly exacerbates an already difficult judicial task.97
B. TECHNOLOGICALLY ENHANCED OBSERVATION AND KNOWING
EXPOSURE TO THE PUBLIC
The problems with the general public use and naked eye
doctrines go much deeper than difficulties in pinning down
their meaning. Ultimately neither doctrine is sufficiently
grounded in Fourth Amendment theory, either as laid out in
Katz or as a more general proposition. This conclusion is par-
ticularly evident when one tries to connect these doctrines with
Katz's "knowing exposure" language.
As Part I explained,9 in Ciraolo the Supreme Court relied
on the statement in Katz that activities "knowingly expose[d] to
the public, even in [the] home or office" do not deserve Fourth
Amendment protection, and Kyllo later cited Ciraolo to bolster
its adoption of the general public use exception. Yet the logical
connection between this aspect of Katz and the Court's rules
concerning technologically enhanced home surveillance is ex-
96. Compare, e.g., State v. Taylor, 401 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ohio Ct. App.
1978) (looking into an apartment from the "semi-public walkway" leading to
the building is not a search), with State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Minn.
1997) (looking into an apartment window from the common area just outside
the apartment window where bushes had to be walked around is a search),
and Borum v. United States, 318 A.2d 590, 592 (D.C. 1974) (looking through a
crack or hole in an apartment door is not a search). Compare State v. Morrow,
291 N.W.2d 298, 299 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (looking under a door is a search),
with Moody v. State, 295 So. 2d 272, 273-74 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974) (looking
through partially open blinds is not a search), and State v. Jordan, 631 P.2d
989, 990, 992 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (looking through a space between drape
and window frame is a search). Compare Commonwealth v. Hernley, 263 A.2d
904, 905-06 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970) (peering into a window using a four-foot lad-
der is not a search), with State v. Kender, 588 P.2d 447, 449, 451 (Haw. 1978)
(climbing three-quarters of the way up a fence and bracing oneself on a fellow
officer's shoulder to see into a backyard is a search). The last two cases in-
volved uses of enhancement devices.
97. Even more daunting is the possibility that the general use and naked
eye exceptions could work together, so that no search occurs when police use
novel technology to spy what naked eye viewing or viewing with technology in
general use could have observed. Because observation with generally used
technology is apparently meant to be equated with naked eye observation in
terms of privacy expectations, this bootstrapping of the two exceptions is not
implausible.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
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tremely tenuous. Almost by definition, activities in the home
that are observed using enhancement devices are not "know-
ingly" exposed to the public. As suggested above, police usually
use technology because they want to ensure the target does not
know about the surveillance and because they believe naked
eye viewing is not feasible.
The only cases cited by the Katz opinion to support its
"knowing exposure" language were Lewis v. United States" and
United States v. Lee.1°' Both involved scenarios quite different
from enhanced observation of the home. In Lewis, the Court
held that no search occurred when an undercover agent entered
Lewis's home after Lewis had invited him there under the im-
pression he wanted to buy drugs.01 In contrast to the person
subjected to covert technological surveillance, Lewis knew he
was disclosing information to a third party.10 2 In Lee, the Court
held that no search occurred when government agents used a
searchlight to discern cans of alcohol on the deck of Lee's
boat. 0 3 Whether or not Lee knowingly exposed these cans to
public view (arguably he intended to hide them under cover of
darkness), they were clearly positioned on the equivalent of the
boat's curtilage, not in its interior, a point the Court seemed to
find important when it stated, "[iUt is not shown that there was
any exploration below decks or under hatches."0 4 In Lewis,
there was "knowing" exposure. In Lee, the home interior was
not involved. The Kyllo scenario differs from both.
Virtually all of the Court's post-Katz decisions finding that
the Fourth Amendment is not implicated fit one of these two
molds. Either the defendant knowingly revealed information to
a third party, who turned the information over to the govern-
ment,15 or the exposure did not occur inside the home or its
99. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
100., 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
101. 385 U.S. at 211 ("[Wlhen, as here, the home is converted into a com-
mercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting
unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it
were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street.").
102. I would argue Lewis did not knowingly expose anything to the "pub-
lic." I believe a search occurred in Lewis, but I also think it was justified un-
der the Fourth Amendment. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
103. 274 U.S. at 561, 563 ("Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the
use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution.").
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 465 (1985) (information
displayed in public store); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) (to
phone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (to
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curtilage. 11 6 Taken together, the Court's cases stand for the
proposition that covert (i.e., undetected) observation of activi-
ties inside the home triggers the Fourth Amendment.
There is admittedly one post-Katz case involving govern-
ment seizure of information from inside the home that does
seem to have jettisoned the "knowing" requirement. In Smith
v. Maryland,1 0 7 the Court held that even if a person does not
know that the numbers he calls are recorded by the phone
company, he "assume[s] the risk" that they will be.108 Similarly,
it might be said, one assumes the risk that those activities in-
side the home that can be seen with generally used technology
or by a (hypothetical) naked eye observer from outside the
home will in fact be viewed in those ways.
Assumption of risk reasoning in this context is vacuous,
however. The most pertinent illustration of that fact is that
until the Supreme Court decision in Kyllo, in most jurisdictions
we "assumed the risk" that police would subject the interior of
our houses to thermal imaging without obtaining a warrant or
developing any level of suspicion that evidence of crime would
be discovered.09 As I have observed elsewhere, "we only assume
those risks of unregulated government intrusion that the courts
tell us we have to assume.""10 Ultimately, despite Katz's con-
stant citation by the lower courts and the Supreme Court, the
proper query is not the one posed by Justice Stewart's majority
opinion in Katz or by a modified (assumption of risk) version
thereof that focuses on what the target did or did not know or
suspect. Rather, it is the inquiry suggested by Justice Harlan's
bank); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966) (to friend); United
States v. On Lee, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952) (information voluntarily revealed to
undercover agent).
106. Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, and Riley all involved flyovers of the curtilage.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-39; see also California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (garbage at curbside); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294, 304 (1987) (open fields); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984)
(open fields).
107. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
108. Id. at 744 (noting that although the petitioner may have had a subjec-
tive expectation that the phone numbers he dialed were private, "[wihen he
used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the or-
dinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.").
109. Prior to Kyllo, a majority of jurisdictions had declared that use of
thermal imagers was not a search. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
110. Slobogin, supra note 66, at 400.
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concurring opinion in that case: Is suspicionless observation of
the home interior using enhancement devices something that
"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'"? Kyllo itself
accepted this point, and it is to that issue I now turn.
C. TECHNOLOGICALLY ENHANCED OBSERVATION AND
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
As the Kyllo majority recognized, "[the Katz test-whether
the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable-has often been criticized
as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable." 2 Yet, the
Court continued, at least "in the case of the search of the inte-
rior of homes-the prototypical and hence most commonly liti-
gated area of protected privacy-there is a ready criterion,
with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation
of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reason-"v.I ,113
able. From this premise the majority reached its holding
that enhanced surveillance, relying on technology that is not in
general public use and that detects more detail than any lawful
naked eye observation could have, is a search. "This," claimed
the Court, "assures preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted.""'
Thus, the Court bottomed its analysis of privacy expecta-
tions vis-h-vis enhanced home surveillance on historical as-
sumptions. To the extent the Court believed history supported
the general public use and naked eye exceptions to its holding,
it may well be wrong. In any event, if the scope of the Fourth
Amendment as applied to technological surveillance depends on
expectations "society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,"
we ought to consult more recent sources than attitudes that
pre-existed the invention of flashlights and binoculars by over
100 years" 5 (and most other technological surveillance tech-
niques by almost two centuries). Modern law and empirical
work suggests that society is not prepared to recognize either
exception.
As far as history is concerned, there is not much to go on.
111. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
112. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 93.
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The Kyllo majority quotes the famous statement from the
seminal English case Entick v. Carrington116 that "the eye can-
not by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.""' Although
that statement is irrefutably true, given that the common law
of trespass required a physical intrusion, it does not answer the
historical question posed in Kyllo, which is whether naked eye
or nominally enhanced viewing of the home violated colonial
notions of privacy."" Other than its quote from an English
case, Kyllo provides nothing in support of its view that the typi-
cal eighteenth century American was unfazed when strangers
spied into his or her home from a public vantage point. In con-
trast, we do know that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment
were obsessed with protecting the security of the house. As
John Adams put it,
An Englishmans [sic] dwelling House is his Castle. The Law has
erected a Fortification round it-and as every Man is Party to the
Law, i.e. the Law is a Covenant of every Member of society with every
other Member, therefore every Member of Society has entered into a
solemn Covenant with every other that he shall enjoy in his own
dwelling House as compleat a security, safety and Peace and Tran-
quility as if it was surrounded with Walls of Brass, with Ramparts
and Palisadoes and defended with a Garrison and Artillery.119
Professor Davies's comprehensive treatment of Fourth
Amendment history confirms that, at the time the Constitution
was drafted, the law provided that "except for extraordinary
circumstances, an officer could not justify 'breaking' (that is,
opening) the outer door of a house unless he acted pursuant to
a judicial warrant."120 Further, as Professor Davies points out,
"breaking" constituted virtually any interference with the
116. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (IKB. 1765) (Early Eng-
lish law reporters sometimes offer different accounts of the same proceedings.
The English Reports version is provided for easy retrieval of the case; how-
ever, the quotation is from Howel's State Trials version.).
117. The Court actually quoted Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628
(1886), which in turn quoted at length from Entick.
118. The Court itself recognized this point even in the days when trespass
doctrine governed the definition of search. In McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (1948), in the course of holding that looking over a door transom was
a search, the Court rejected the argument that "the eye cannot commit the
trespass condemned by the Fourth Amendment," stating it would not "stop to
examine that syllogism for flaws" but that it did "reject the result" that notion
would have required in McDonald. Id. at 454.
119. 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 137 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965) (quoting Adams's notes of his argument in the 1774 case
King v. Stewart).
120. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 643 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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home, including something as slight as "lifting up the latch."12'
If moving a latch was a search requiring a warrant in colonial
times, peering into a window could easily have been considered
one as well.
Providing substantiation of that conjecture is the fact that
civil lawsuits involving "Peeping Toms" were heard in New
England as early as the seventeenth century.122 Further, sev-
eral American and English cases in the eighteenth century and
the first half of the nineteenth century permitted criminal
prosecutions for eavesdropping from a vantage point outside
the home.' Although technically these prosecutions focused on
"listening toms" rather than "peeping toms," at least one of
them involved a defendant who "was proved to have watched at
the window of the chamber of the prosecutrix" and was upheld
because "no man has a right.., to pry into your secrecy in your
own house."' In any event, by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, civil and criminal trespass law in leading jurisdictions
clearly prohibited window-peering.' As one decision in 1897
opined, "[wle cannot conceive of any conduct much more inde-
cent and insulting than for a stranger to be peeking into the
windows of an occupied, lighted residence, and especially at the
121. Id. at n.261 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 226 (1769) (reprinted facsimile The University of Chicago
Press, 1979)); see also Curtis v. Hubbard, 1 Hill 336, 338 (N.Y. 1841) (holding
that "[1]ifting a latch is, in law, just as much a breaking, as the forcing of a
door bolted with iron").
122. After describing prosecutions for eavesdropping, Professor Flaherty
states,
Peeping Toms were similarly held up to ignominy at law [in colonial
times]. A New Haven man won a slander and defamation suit
against a fellow citizen who had accused him of coming "in the night
to peep in at his window." John Severns of Salisbury entered a com-
plaint against two young men in 1680, "for hovering about his house,
peeping in at the window."
DAVID H. FLABERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 89 (1972).
123. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 108 (1808). Blackstone's
description of the laws of England in the eighteenth century included within
the "common nuisance" category "[e]avesdroppers, or such as listen under
walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to harken after discourse, and there-
upon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales." 4 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 132 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001).
124. Commonwealth v. Lovett, 6 Clark's Pa. L.J. Reps. 226,226-27 (1831).
125. City of Grand Rapids v. Williams, 70 N.W. 547, 548 (Mich. 1897) (af-
firming a conviction for disorderly conduct for peering into a window near mid-
night); Moore v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 29 N.E. 997, 997-98 (N.Y. 1892) (granting
damages for an apartment dweller's loss of privacy due to exposure to an
elevated train platform).
1420
2002] PEEPING TECHNO-TOMS 1421
hours of night when people usually retire." 6
More importantly, this notion retains viability today. At
least twenty-five states have statutes that criminalize looking
into the home, under labels such as "voyeurism," "criminal sur-
veillance," "criminal trespass," or simply "disorderly conduct."
127
Convictions under such laws, including very recent ones, have
often been based simply on evidence that the defendant was
seen peering into a window, with intent to invade privacy in-
ferred from the conduct." s  Tort caselaw similarly indicates
that "spying into windows of a home" can lead to compensable
injury for invasion of privacy or the tort of intrusion.29  These
126. Williams, 70 N.W. at 548.
127. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-32 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1504 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(8) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 647(k) (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 820 (2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 810.14 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61 (1999); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 711-1111 (1993); IDAHO CODE §18-7006 (Michie Supp. 2001); 720 ILL.
COAIP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-1(5) (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-5 (Michie
1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. § 609.746
(2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-3 (West
1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08
(Anderson 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1171 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-45-1(6) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470 (Law. Co-op. 1975); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-3 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-607 (Supp.
2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-130 (Michie 1996). For limitations imposed by
some of these laws, see infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. Massachu-
setts, Oregon, and the District of Columbia have affirmed convictions for vo-
yeurism under disorderly conduct statutes. See Commonwealth v. Lepore, 666
N.E.2d 152, 156 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (construing the Massachusetts disor-
derly conduct statute to include voyeurism); Carey v. District of Columbia, 102
A.2d 314, 315 (App. D.C. 1954) (construing a disorderly conduct statute to
permit conviction for voyeurism); DeLashmitt v. Journal Publ'g Co., 114 P.2d
1018, 1019 (Or. 1941) (describing imposition of a fine for "looking in the win-
dows of another's home"). Since most states have disorderly conduct statutes,
in theory peeping toms could be prosecuted in most other states as well.
128. See, e.g., J.F.C. v. City of Daphne, 2001 WL 564263, at *3-4 (Ala.
Crim. App. May 25, 2001) (finding evidence sufficient to find a juvenile guilty
of criminal surveillance, even though the state did not establish that the juve-
nile saw a person inside the apartment into which he was peeping, where the
sheriff testified that he saw the juvenile late at night crouched below a win-
dow of the apartment, peering into the window, and when the sheriff identi-
fied himself as a law enforcement officer and instructed the juvenile and a
companion to stand still); Mosely v. State, 166 S.E. 455, 455-56 (Ga. Ct. App.
1932) (affirming conviction of a defendant found squatting under a shrub near
a lighted uncurtained bedroom window at 11:40 p.m.); Copeland v. Common-
wealth, 525 S.E.2d 9, 11 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming conviction of window
peeping).
129. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1432 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(finding "a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of [plaintiffsl claim
for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion" when a media crew
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laws send the message that society is not prepared to recognize
unjustified spying on the residence as reasonable.
Most of the criminal laws prohibiting voyeurism require
trespass as an element of the offense. 30 But some do not. For
instance, in Louisiana a "Peeping Tom" is defined as "one who
peeps through windows or doors, or other like places, situated
on or about the premises of another for the purpose of spying
upon or invading the privacy of persons spied upon without the
consent of the persons spied upon."13' As this language asserts,
"i]t is not a necessary element of this offense that the 'Peeping
Tom' be upon the premises of the person being spied upon."132
At least five other states have similar statutes,"3 and several
used a shotgun mike, binoculars, and zoom cameras to monitor activity inside
a home); Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) ("An intrusion upon a plaintiffs seclusion or solitude amount-
ing to an invasion of privacy includes eavesdropping upon private conversa-
tions by wiretapping, microphones or spying into windows of a home.");
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 855 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.
1984) (citing cases holding that the tort of intrusion "is to be applied to peering
into the windows of a home"). The Restatement states that "[olne who inten-
tionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of an-
other or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
130. Several also limit conviction to those who have a "lewd" intent or some
other sexual motivation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 810.14(1) (2000) (requiring
"lewd, lascivious, or indecent intent"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61 (2000)
("lewd, licentious and indecent purpose"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08
(Anderson 1999 & Supp. 2001) ("for the purpose of sexually arousing or grati-
fying the person's self'); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1(a)(6) (2000) ("lascivious
purpose"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-607(a)(2) (2001) (similar language). Two
also exclude from their purview officers involved in "lawful criminal investiga-
tion." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-130 (Michie Supp. 2001); see also MINN. STAT. §
609.746(f) (2000).
131. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (West 1986) (emphasis added).
132. Id.; see also Souder y. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716, 718
(La. Ct. App. 1956).
133. AR. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(8) (Michie 1997) ("on or about the prem-
ises of another"); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61(a) (1999) ("on or about the prem-
ises of another"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-5 (Michie 1998) (penalizing "a per-
son who peeps "into an occupied dwelling of another"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1171A (West Supp. 2002) ("Every person who hides, waits or otherwise
loiters in the vicinity of any private dwelling house, apartment building or any
other place of residence.., with the unlawful and willful intent to watch,
gaze, or look upon any person in a clandestine manner, [is guilty of a misde-
meanor]."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470 (Law. Co-op. 1985) ("on or about the
premises of another"); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-3 (West Supp. 2001-
2002) (penalizing a person who, "knowing that he is not licensed or privileged
to do so,... peers into a window or other opening of a dwelling"); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-202 (1999) ("Any person who shall peep secretly into any room oc-
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other jurisdictions construe their laws to cover non-trespassory
surveillance, T'M or define trespass very loosely.135 Thus, in these
states, naked eye viewing that does not involve physical intru-
sion into constitutionally protected areas can be a crime.
Even in those states that require clear proof of trespass for
a Peeping Tom violation, the kind of viewing Kyllo places out-
side the ambit of the Fourth Amendment might be a crime, de-
pending on how the courts define "constitutionally protected
area." Many courts have refused to include certain types of
curtilage in that definition"36 (a stance with which at least one
member of the Supreme Court agrees"13). In those jurisdictions,
voyeurism from such curtilage areas would not implicate the
Fourth Amendment as construed in Kyllo. But it would still be
a crime in trespass states, because curtilage is private prop-
cupied by a female person shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.").
134. See, e.g., Carey v. District of Columbia, 102 A.2d 314, 315 (D.C. 1954)
(affirming the voyeurism conviction of a defendant who stood on "the lawn
outside the window" but emphasizing the act of looking, stating, "[wjhat action
could be more disturbing, offensive, or insulting than to have a total stranger
peeping into the window of one's lighted apartment, especially at 1:30 in the
morning?"); People v. Miller, 415 N.E.2d 538 (IM. App. Ct. 1980) (finding valid
the arrest for disorderly conduct of an individual found in a walkway next to a
women's dormitory at nine p.m.); Commonwealth v. LePore, 666 N.E.2d 152,
155-56 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (affirming a conviction for disorderly conduct
when defendant looked in a window from an alleyway); Gov't v. Stagger, 13
V.I. 233 (1977) (conviction for "disturbing the peace" upheld where the defen-
dant stood on the ledge of an adjacent building and looked into a lighted
room).
135. See, e.g., J.F.C. v. City of Daphne, 2001 WL 564263, at *2 (Ala. Crim.
App. May 25, 2001) (stating that "even if an individual is generally licensed
and privileged to use the common areas of the property on which the apart-
ment building is situated, [he would violate the criminal surveillance provision
by] using the common areas in a manner so as to invade the privacy of the
residents of other apartments located on the property"); State v. Serrano, 702
P.2d 1343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming a conviction for criminal trespass of
the individual who looked into a lighted dorm window from bushes lining the
side of the dorm).
136. See, e.g., Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 511 P.2d 33, 35 (Cal. 1973) (en
banc) ("A sidewalk, pathway, common entrance or similar passageway offers
an implied permission to the public to enter which necessarily negates any
reasonable expectancy of privacy in regard to obser[v]ations made there.").
137. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (arguing that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when "the
apartment in question was a garden apartment that was partly below ground
level; ... families frequently used the grassy area just outside the apartment's
window for walking or for playing;... members of the public also used the
area just outside the apartment's window to store bicycles;... [and the officer]
walked to a position about 1 to 1 1/2 feet in front of the window [and] stood
there for about 15 minutes looking down through a set of venetian blinds").
14232002]
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erty. Further, most of the Peeping Tom statutes that require
trespass do not contemplate the possibility of home viewing us-
ing enhancement devices that obviate such an intrusion; the
one statute that does (California's) eliminates the trespass ele-
ment in this situation.13 This suggests that, when states begin
to focus on surveillance using enhancement equipment, the
trespass requirement will go by the wayside.
Finally, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that
society considers home surveillance using enhancement devices
to be more intrusive than the Supreme Court seems to think.
In a study that I conducted with Joseph Schumacher, 217 sub-
jects were asked to rate the relative intrusiveness of 50 scenar-
ios taken from Supreme Court and lower court cases.'39 The re-
sponses of the subjects, averaged together, provided a hierarchy
of intrusiveness, ranging from looking through foliage in a pub-
lic park (R=1) to a body cavity search (R=50).' 40
Most interesting for present purposes were the rankings
assigned to the three scenarios involving enhancement de-
vices-shining a flashlight down a dark alley next to a home
(R=3), flying 400 yards above a backyard in a helicopter (R=10),
and watching a person in a front yard using binoculars
(R=33).141 The flyover was ranked roughly the same as two sce-
narios involving roadblocks (R=9; R=14), an action the courts
have held implicates the Fourth Amendment (although stops
made at such checkpoints need not be based on individualized
suspicion).142 More importantly for the subject of this Article,
138. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(i) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002)
(prohibiting "peek[ing] in the door or window of any inhabited building or
structure" while "loitering, prowling, or wandering upon the private property
of another"), with id. § 647(k) (Supp. 2002) (prohibiting "look[ing] through a
hole or opening into, or otherwise view[ing], by means of any instrumentality,
including, but not limited to, a periscope, telescope, binoculars, camera,
motion picture camera, or camcorder, the interior of a bathroom, changing
room... or the interior of any other area in which the occupant has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of a
person or persons inside"). See also Derek L. Kinnen, 8 Hilliard Men Charged
in Case, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 15, 2001, at P-2 (stating that a man was
charged with voyeurism after found walking on the beach near midnight look-
ing in people's windows with binoculars).
139. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
"Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727,
735-37 (1993).
140. Id. at 737-39 tbl.1.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990)
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the scenario involving binocular surveillance of the front yard
was ranked at roughly the same level of intrusiveness as ex-
amination of a car trunk (R=29), a footlocker in a car (R=32),
and a garage (R=37),' all actions the courts consider to be
searches requiring probable cause.' Although not scenarios
included in the study, use of binoculars to look into a house
would presumably have been ranked as even more intrusive,
and unenhanced spying on the home interior would probably
have also been ranked as fairly intrusive, at least at the same
level as binocular viewing of a front yard.
Thus, evidence from history, positive law, and social sci-
ence casts significant doubt on Kyllo's apparent conclusion that
societal mores concerning privacy are not transgressed by sus-
picionless surveillance of the home interior carried out with de-
vices that are in general public use or that can see what the
naked eye could see from a lawful vantage point. This conclu-
sion, especially when combined with the inscrutability of the
general use and naked eye doctrines discussed earlier, argues
for a different holding in Kyllo: Peering into the home by gov-
ermnent officials, at least when it relies on enhancement de-
vices, should always be considered a Fourth Amendment
search. The next section explores how this notion can be im-
plemented.
III. TWO POST-KYLLO PROPOSALS
A rule that all technological spying on the interior of the
home is a search not only captures society's expectations of pri-
vacy-whether defined historically or by today's standards-
but can also easily be reconciled with the language of the
Fourth Amendment. To "search" means "to look into or over
carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover some-
thing.21 45  The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches of houses. Thus, as many others have pointed out
14 6
(stating that "[pletitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth
Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint," and
requiring that the selection and operation of the checkpoint be "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment).
143. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 139, at 738.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (requiring prob-
able cause for a search of a car); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (re-
quiring probable cause for the search of a garage).
145. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1042 (1973).
146. The classic statement is from Professor Amsterdam. "The plain mean-
ing of the English language would surely not be affronted if every police activ-
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(and even Kyllo intimated 47), it does not stretch the Fourth
Amendment in the slightest to say it is implicated when police
look carefully or thoroughly for something inside a house.
If that were the rule, then under current Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence all governmental peering into houses-
even naked eye viewing-would require probable cause, as well
as a warrant in non-exigent circumstances. The obvious pro-
test against this interpretation is that it would seriously ham-
per police investigation. Police with suspicion short of probable
cause to believe that criminal activity is taking place inside a
home would be unable to verify their suspicion through obser-
vation, either with or without a warrant. Indeed, a cynic might
claim that it is this concern, not history or assessments of soci-
ety's privacy expectations, that best explains Kyllo's general
public use and naked eye exceptions.
I have previously proposed a regulatory approach that
would allow police the benefit of their observations, inadvertent
and otherwise, without sacrificing individual privacy inter-
ests.148 Although "search" would be broadly construed under
this proposal, so too would "probable cause" (to mean "that
cause which makes probable the reasonableness of the intru-
sion occasioned by a given search or seizure").149 Thus, the level
of cause needed to justify a search would depend upon its in-
trusiveness. Probable cause, as currently defined, would not
always be necessary to peer into the home interior. As noted
ity that involves seeking out crime or evidence of crime were held to be a
search .... Unless history restricts the amplitude of language, no police inves-
tigative activity can escape the Fourth Amendment's grasp." Anthony Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396
(1974).
147. 533 U.S. 27, 32 & n.1 (2001) ("One might think that... examining the
portion of a house that is in plain public view.., is a 'search.' ... When the
Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to 'search' meant '[t]o look over or
through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspec-
tion; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.") (cita-
tion omitted).
148. My first effort on this score was in 1991, and was updated in 1998 in a
symposium on Terry v. Ohio. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a
Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Slobogin, Fourth
Amendment]; Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvena-
tion of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053 (1998) [here-
inafter Slobogin, Proportionality Principle].
149. Slobogin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 148, at 76. This definition
would still permit a robust warrant requirement, because warrants could still
be based on "probable cause," as required by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
77-78.
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years ago by Professor Amsterdam, the practical advantage of
this proportionality approach is that it "would considerably
ease the strains that the... monolithic model of the Fourth
Amendment... imposes on the process of defining the amend-
ment's outer boundaries." 150
Although the proportionality principle can be reconciled
with the Fourth Amendment, 5' it does cut against the grain of
standard Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence.1 12 A second
proposal that has more solid legal precedent and that could also
address the problems raised by Kyllo is patterned on Title IIrs
prohibition of warrantless electronic communications surveil-
lance. Analogous legislation banning particular forms of en-
hanced visual surveillance could in effect nullify both the gen-
eral public use and naked eye exceptions.
A. THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
Here is the first sentence of a recent news story: "When
Sgt. John Shupe went looking for a serial thief last month, he
packed his car with the tools of his trade: a night-vision tele-
scope, high-resolution binoculars, a camcorder and a shot-
gun.'51. 3 The story goes on to note that Shupe's team has car-
ried out over 400 surveillance operations in the past year,
which led to 127 arrests.5 It does not describe how the various
enhancement devices Shupe carries are employed. If Shupe
were to use any of these items to peer randomly into homes
from his car, on the off chance he would spy the serial thief,
would he be violating the Fourth Amendment? Very possibly
not, after Kyllo. The camcorder and binoculars could easily be
considered items that are in general public use, and the scope
might be as well. Even if they are not, any activities that
Shupe sees while using them that might also have been seen by
the casual observer on the sidewalk could well be covered by
150. Amsterdam, supra note 146, at 393.
151. See Slobogin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 148, at 75-78.
152. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1987) (responding to
the suggestion that a cursory inspection might require reasonable suspicion
rather than probable cause, the majority stated, "[wie are unwilling to send
police and judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a crea-
ture of uncertain description that is neither a 'plain view' inspection nor yet a
'full-blown search.' Nothing in the prior opinions of this Court supports such a
distinction....")
153. Laura Loh, Specialists in Surveillance Get Their Man, LA. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2001, at B3.
154. Id.
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the naked eye exception. A final resolution of these matters
would depend upon which definition of general public use is
adopted and how easily naked eye viewing from a lawful van-
tage could be hypothesized.
Now consider another story, this one a description of the
pre-Kyllo case of United States v. Wright. 5' At 4:20 p.m., police
located the remains of a stolen car under circumstances indicat-
ing that it had been stripped in that vicinity.156 During a sys-
tematic sweep of the surrounding area, they found sweepings of
nuts and bolts, as well as red rags similar to those found next
to the car's carcass, in front of a three-car garage facing onto an
alley.157 The sliding doors of the garage, although locked, were
not completely closed because of the way they were constructed
and their age.5 Although it was daytime, Officer Huffstutler
used his flashlight to look through the door gap into the garage
interior and see parts that had been removed from the stolen
car.9 The majority held that use of the flashlight was not a
search, 6 ' while the dissent emphasized that the garage doors
were locked and stated, "[c]ertainly a flashlight is not standard
equipment for 'any curious passerby,' particularly in the day-
time."'5 ' If flashlights are in general public use, which is the
case under most definitions of that term, then the majority's
holding seems to be more consistent with Kyllo. On the other
hand, if one takes the empirical, general use for a particular
purpose approach adopted by the dissent, then perhaps the of-
ficer's actions did constitute a search. On the third hand, the
inside of the garage was only "relatively dark" according to the
court (meaning the flashlight was useful but not absolutely
necessary),62 and the officer was kneeling on public property
when he peered inside, so perhaps the naked eye exception
would apply here.
Under the proportionality approach, both Shupe's surveil-
lance of home interiors and Huffstutler's exploration of the ga-
155. 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
156. Id. at 1356.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 1359 ("It has long been settled that objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.").
161. Id. at 1368 (Wright, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1356.
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rage would be searches. Whether these searches were valid
under the Fourth Amendment would depend upon the level of
justification and the level of intrusion. If Shupe randomly
peered into houses, then he would be violating the Fourth
Amendment, because his suspicion is too minimal for even a
slight intrusion into the home.'6 If, however, he is in a neigh-
borhood thought to be a target of the serial thief, he should be
able to use his binoculars and nightscope to scan rooftops,
yards, and house exteriors for suspicious movement and, if he
spies any, focus on that movement long enough to ascertain its
nature, even if it involves viewing inside a window and even in
the absence of full probable cause. Similarly, Huffstutler's ob-
servation of the car parts and rags gave him sufficient cause,
even if not probable cause, for a brief look at the interior of a
garage with or without a flashlight."M
Under proportionality analysis, the ubiquity of the en-
hancement device the police use is entirely irrelevant. So is
any inquiry into whether the details observed through en-
hancement could have been viewed with the naked eye from a
lawful vantage point. The only issues are the level of intrusion
visited by the police action and the level of justification for it.
The two significant practical advantages of this approach
should be apparent. First, it avoids the complications associ-
ated with the general public use and naked eye doctrines. Sec-
ond, as suggested by Professor Amsterdam, it avoids the
strains placed on courts and the police by the rigid search-
requires-probable-cause precept. In most of the Court's cases
that address the definition of "search" for Fourth Amendment
purposes, the police have had sufficient suspicion under a pro-
portionality approach to justify their enhanced searches. 65
163. In contrast, simply viewing homes from the patrol car as an officer
drives down the street would not be a search, since it does not involve looking
"carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover something." See supra
text accompanying notes 145-46.
164. In non-exigent circumstances such as those involved in Wright, how-
ever, I would require the police to obtain a warrant before engaging in a
search of a particular dwelling. See Slobogin, Fourth Amendment, supra note
148, at 37 ("Exigent circumstances would exist only when government investi-
gators are confronted with imminent violence to others, disappearance of evi-
dence, or escape of a suspect. Otherwise, the search and seizure should be ap-
proved beforehand.").
165. See Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 148, at 1073. This
is true not only of the cases directly relevant to this Article, but also of other
cases that define "search." Take, for instance, the Supreme Court's decisions
in Lewis and Lee. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104. In Lewis, the
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Thus, had the Supreme Court adopted that approach, it "could
have had its cake and eaten it too."
166
The proportionality idea also makes sense conceptually.
Under the monolithic approach, courts are encouraged, as the
majority was in Wright, to declare actions that are clearly
searches to be non-searches. That result leaves a huge range of
intrusive police actions completely unregulated by the Fourth
Amendment, including, most probably, use of flashlights and
binoculars to look in our homes. At the same time, under cur-
rent rules no search, even a relatively unintrusive one, can take
place unless police have full-blown probable cause. As I have
argued elsewhere,167 that result runs counter to legal reasoning
in a number of other constitutional and non-constitutional do-
mains, where the required justification need only be propor-
tionate to the impact of the government intervention.
The usual criticism of 'the proportionality idea, also ad-
vanced by Professor Amsterdam, is that "a graduated Fourth
Amendment"e 6 8 would become "one immense Rorschach blot."
169
I have previously responded to this criticism in detail."0 The
defendant had offered to sell the police drugs over the phone and invited them
to his house to consummate the sale, giving them probable cause sufficient to
enter Lewis's home. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966). In Lee,
the Coast Guard followed the defendant's boat to a point 24 miles offshore
commonly referred to as "Rum Row" where it docked with a French boat, giv-
ing it minimal suspicion, but sufficient to shine a searchlight on the exterior of
Lee's boat. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 560 (1927). Both Lewis and
Lee involved searches, but under a proportionate definition of cause, both were
also justified.
166. Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 148, at 1073.
167. Id. at 1068-69 (discussing standards of proof in criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, levels of scrutiny in constitutional litigation, procedural due process
analysis, and proof requirements in the tort context).
168. Amsterdam, supra note 146, at 393.
169. Id. Elsewhere Professor Amsterdam has even choicer words for the
proportionality approach. Id. at 415 (calling the approach "splendid in its
flexibility, awful in its unintelligibility, unadministrability, unenforcibility and
general ooziness").
170. See Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 148, at 1093-95
(noting that current law is already complicated, that a proportionality ap-
proach based on four tiers of cause is administrable, that concrete rules would
eventually develop, and that the ex ante review requirement would prevent
arbitrary actions); Slobogin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 148, at 71-75
(proportionality approach would allow courts and police to do openly what they
do in any event). It is worth noting that Professor Amsterdam, although leery
of a graduated Fourth Amendment, stated that "the difficulty must be faced
and the line must be drawn because the total exemption of police espionage
from Fourth Amendment control seems to me destructive of at least some in-
terests of privacy and security that are indispensable to a free society." Am-
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only point I will make here is that, contrary to Professor Am-
sterdam's suggestion, the courts are quite capable of dealing
with the proportionality approach. Most obviously, they have
been applying a graduated Fourth Amendment in the seizure
context since at least Terry v. Ohio.17' Further, despite what
they say, courts often taken the same approach where searches
are involved. Exhibit One is once again Terry, which held that
a frisk only requires reasonable suspicion." 2 Consider also one
of the leading enhancement device cases, United States v.
Karo."' There the Supreme Court held that use of a beeper to
detect movement inside a house is a search, but also indicated
that a warrant for such a search might be valid even if based on
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.74 Although
not provided by the Court, the rationale for allowing a lower
level of suspicion might be that a beeper does not reveal the de-
tail that direct visual observation does; whereas, as Kyllo held,
the precise capacity of the device used is not relevant to
whether a search occurs when the target is a house interior. It
might help define the level of justification necessary for such a
search under proportionality analysis.
175
The lower courts routinely engage in proportionality analy-
sis as well. For instance, in Wright, the case described above,
the majority gave as an alternative ground for its holding the
fact that, though the police may not have had probable cause,
sterdam, supra note 146, at 408-09. He also suggests that flexible rules can be
devised through police administrative rulemaking rather than judicial fiat.
Id. at 417-18 (arguing that administrative rulemaking need not be "limited to
the warrants and the probable cause standard").
171. 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (holding that stops short of arrest are permissi-
ble based on reasonable suspicion). A number of other Supreme Court cases
permit seizures based on something short of probable cause. See, e.g., Michi-
gan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (holding that an occupant of a house may
be detained for the duration of the search of the house pursuant to a warrant);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (requiring the
driver of a stopped car to exit does not require suspicion)United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that a checkpoint stop for illegal
immigrants does not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion).
172. 392 U.S. at 23.
173. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
174. See id. at 718 ("It will be time enough to resolve the probable cause-
reasonable suspicion issue in a case that requires it.").
175. See also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in the judgment) ("[A] dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally in-
trusive one that could be justified in this situation under Terry upon mere rea-
sonable suspicion.").
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they had developed sufficient cause to look into the garage.
1 7 6
Similar holdings are found or implied in a number of other de-
cisions. 17 7 The role of the courts under an explicit proportional-
ity approach would simply be to determine "how much explana-
tion for a given intrusion is necessary to convince an innocent
person subjected to it that the police acted reasonably,"178 no
more and no less.
Kyllo does not necessarily reject this approach in the con-
text of enhanced surveillance of the home. Both the general
public use and naked eye doctrines could be characterized as
dicta. 79  Or, both doctrines might be defined so narrowly that
176. United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1357-60 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dis-
cussing a "closer look at a challenging situation" and "plain view" as alterna-
tive justifications, with the former assuming a search occurred, albeit perhaps
in the absence of probable cause),
177. See United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992)
(looking into the window of a shop building near a residence is a search, but
lawful because police had an arrest warrant for defendant and had reason to
believe he was there); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1173 (11th
Cir. 1991) (turning the key in a lock is a search, but the intrusion was "so
small" that neither a search warrant nor full probable cause was necessary);
Dorsey v. United States, 372 F.2d 928, 930-31 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding, with-
out addressing whether action was a search or was justified as such, that offi-
cers' shining light into a car upon seeing two known addicts facing each other
and looking under seat was permitted, because police are entitled to "take a
closer look at challenging situations as they encounter them"); United States
v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (D. Me. 1985) ("[The brief surveillance
involved in the present case... was undertaken in response to the receipt of
specific information concerning the cultivation of marijuana on the Bassford
property."); State v. Torres, 645 A.2d 529, 534-35 (Conn. 1994) (assuming a
dog sniff of a car was a search, but lawful because it was on "reasonable and
articulable suspicion"); State v. Christensen, 953 P.2d 583, 588 (Idaho 1998)
(holding that entry onto property marked with a "No Trespassing" sign was a
search, but could be permissible without a warrant if something more serious
than inquiries about nearby residents is the justification); State v. Cloutier,
544 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Me. 1988) (concluding that entry onto private property
was permissible based on recent burglary reports in the area and the fact that
the basement was the only illuminated room in the house, stating that to en-
ter property "a police officer must be on some police business," which need not
require probable cause or reasonable suspicion; it may be "administrative as
well as investigative, and it may be action based on a suspicion that turns out
to be without substantial basis, provided the suspicion is held in good faith
rather than as a pretext for an arbitrary search").
178. Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 148, at 1084.
179. It is worth noting that the Kyllo majority never firmly adopted the
general public use doctrine. In a footnote, it stated that general public use
"may" be a factor in the search analysis, and intimated it might "reexamine"
this factor in the future. 533 U.S. 27, 39 n.6 (2001) ("Given that we can quite
confidently say that thermal imaging is not 'routine,' we decline in this case to
reexamine that factor."). The naked eye doctrine was also unnecessary to its
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they have no practical impact.8" At the same time, following
the suggestion in Karo, searches of houses (enhanced or not)
that cannot by their nature reveal intimate details or that for
some other reason are not particularly intrusive could be justi-
fied on something less than probable cause as traditionally de-
fined.
B. A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
Federal legislation has regulated electronic communica-
tions surveillance since 1968, when Congress passed the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which most courts des-
ignate simply "Title III. " 181 Similar federal legislation
regulating enhanced visual surveillance-a sort of national
"Peeping Techno-Tom law"--might prove to be a worthy alter-
native to Kyllo, in addition to or instead of the proportionality
approach. Here I briefly describe how Title III might serve as a
model for that purpose.
Title III deals with interception of oral, wire, and electronic
communications, but for present purposes the provisions re-
garding oral communication are most pertinent. Title III de-
fines the latter type of communication as "any oral communica-
tion uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circum-
stances justifying such expectation,"'82 and defines "intercept"
to mean "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of
any... oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device."' It then prohibits all "inten-
tional" interceptions of oral communications, so defined, unless
they are judicially authorized or one of the parties to the com-
decision, as the thermal imager obviously detected more than the naked eye
could see from a public vantage point.
180. For instance, if "general public use" were defined to require use by the
entire population to carry out the activity in question, it would have no appli-
cation in connection with home surveillance. If the naked eye doctrine were
defined to require clear proof that all of the activities and items seen with the
enhancement device could also have been seen with the naked eye from a
completely public vantage point (e.g., sidewalks, but not curtilage or other ar-
eas abutting the home), then it too would have little purchase.
181. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000). This federal statute preempts
state law on electronic surveillance. See id. § 2516(2); cf United States v. Tor-
torello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1973).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
183. Id. § 2510(4).
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munication consents to the interception."" Violations can lead
not only to exclusion of evidence, but to civil and criminal pen-
alties. 185
One important effect of these provisions is that they crimi-
nalize all nonconsensual electronic eavesdropping by civilians.
Other parts of Title III reinforce this prohibition by banning
the manufacture and sale of "any electronic, mechanical, or
other device [that is] primarily useful for the purpose of the
surreptitious interception of... oral... communications."86 Al-
though ordinary interception devices (such as tape recorders)
are not covered by this provision, hidden recorders or micro-
phones may be.'87
With important modifications, these provisions can be ap-
plied in the visual surveillance context. First, just as unau-
thorized interceptions of oral communications are prohibited,
the proposed statute would ban nonconsensual, warrantless
"visual surveillance" of "private locations."'8 The latter term
could be defined as "the interior of the home and all other areas
in which activities are carried out or items possessed by people
exhibiting an expectation that such activities or items are not
subject to surveillance under circumstances justifying such an
expectation." "Visual surveillance" could be defined as "the
viewing of a private location using any electronic, mechanical,
or other device." If that definition is viewed as too broad (it
would include viewing private locations with eyeglasses as well
as cameras, for instance), the phrase "that enhances normal
(20-20) vision" could be added. Any intentional visual surveil-
lance of private locations, so defined, would be prohibited
184. Id. § 2511(2). There are a few other exceptions to the prohibition that
are not pertinent here. See generally id. § 2511.
185. Id. § 2511(4), (5) (respectively criminal penalties and civil suits).
186. Id. § 2512(1).
187. See United States v. Biro, 143 F.3d 1421, 1427 (11th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that § 2512 encompasses "pens, wall plugs, and calculators containing con-
cealed transmitters"); United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1123 (7th
Cir. 1984) (finding that a "briefcase containing a tape recorder, an amplifier, a
voice activation unit, a power source, and [various] patch cords" was "suffi-
cient basis" for a § 2512 conviction); United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595
(C.D. IlM. 1986) (holding that a "Drop-In Telephone Microphone" was clearly
covered by § 2512).
188. Note that several courts have, in effect, already extended Title III in
this fashion to the regulation of video surveillance of homes and like places.
See, e.g., United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1984).
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unless judicially authorized or at least one of the parties under
surveillance consents to it.
Another aspect of the proposed statute would, like Title III,
seek to limit the proliferation of surveillance devices. Unau-
thorized manufacture, sale, or possession of visual surveillance
equipment that is "primarily useful for the purpose of the sur-
reptitious visual surveillance of private locations" could be pro-
hibited. Devices that could see images through walls and video
cameras that are designed to be secreted in briefcases and
clothing clearly fall in this category. Binoculars, flashlights,
nightscopes, and telescopes clearly do not. Devices such as
thermal imagers and beepers fall at the margin. Perhaps with
respect to these types of devices, legislation could place limita-
tions on their purchase and possession similar to those that ex-
ist with surreptitious listening devices.'89
Because it bans warrantless, nonconsensual technological
surveillance of "private locations," defined to include the inte-
rior of residences, this statute should render virtually irrele-
vant both the general public use and naked eye exceptions to
the extent they allow suspicionless, covert technological sur-
veillance of the home. Analogous exceptions under Title III
have been rejected. For instance, one court found that, al-
though the defendant's voice could often be heard through his
open office door, monitoring of those conversations using
eavesdropping equipment violated the statute.9 ' Parallel rea-
soning in the visual surveillance context would make the naked
eye exception untenable. Similarly noteworthy are Congress's
vacillations on whether Title III protects the radio portion of
cordless telephones. In 1986, Congress amended Title III to ex-
clude conversations on such phones from the ambit of the stat-
ute on the theory that they could be intercepted using "readily
available technologies" such as an AM radio.'91 In 1994, how-
ever, it reversed itself, 92 presumably for reasons similar to
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 2512(2) (permitting possession of surreptitious listen-
ing devices only by providers of communication services or "an officer, agent,
or employee of, or a person under contract with, such a provider, in the normal
course of the business of providing that wire or electronic communication ser-
vice," and by government agents and those under contract with the govern-
ment).
190. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir. 1990).
191. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3566; accord Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981); State v. Howard,
679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984) (accord).
192. Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
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those advanced here against the general public use exception in
visual surveillance cases. In other words, under Title III pri-
vacy does not disappear simply because the technology used to
conduct surveillance is generally available or picks up conver-
sations in private areas that could be heard with the naked ear.
The statute would not, of course, "reverse" that part of
Kyllo that adopts the general public use and naked eye excep-
tions, because they are interpretations of the Constitution. As
a consequence, if the statute did not provide for an exclusionary
remedy (as is the case for those provisions in Title III dealing
with electronic, as opposed to oral or wire, communications193),
then evidence obtained when these exceptions apply, although
observed in violation of the statute, could still be used in court.
But even in this situation the statute would have an impact.
Because it would prohibit covert use of any technology-
including commonly available devices such as flashlights and
binoculars-to spy into homes, courts would be hard put to find
that such items are in general public use for that purpose,
whether they consider the issue empirically or as a matter of
positive law. That position, in turn, should nullify Kyllo's gen-
eral public use exception (unless the Court insists on defining
the exception in terms of general use for any purpose). More-
over, because the statute would prohibit civilian possession of
technology made primarily for covert spying of private loca-
tions, that type of technology would never become "generally
used."
Less directly, the statute would also undermine Kyllo's na-
ked eye exception. Although Congress could perhaps pass a na-
tional Peeping Tom statute,94 the proposed legislation does not
purport to regulate naked eye observation of home interiors.
Thus, unenhanced viewing of the home from a lawful vantage
§ 2510(a) (2000)).
193. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3577 (explaining that, after "discussions with the Department of Jus-
tice," it was decided not to require exclusion when the rules governing inter-
ception of electronic communications were violated).
194. One possible obstacle to such a statute is the Supreme Court's recent
willingness to strike down statutes that are not clearly based on congressional
powers authorized by the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it a
federal offense for any individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a place
that the individual believes or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone,
exceeded Congress's commerce clause authority). While a statute regulating
technology that is sold across state lines meets this test, a statute that regu-
lates naked eye viewing may not.
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point would not be illegal, at least under this statute, and gov-
ernment could still constitutionally avail itself of the naked eye
exception when its technological surveillance discerns only
what such viewing would discern. However, because the stat-
ute would prohibit unauthorized enhanced viewing of the home,
whether undertaken by citizens or the police, the exception
would lose considerable moral force.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Fourth Amendment believed the house
should be sacrosanct. Kyllo leaves that fundamental principle
in doubt. Its "general use" and "naked eye" exceptions to the
general prohibition against enhanced visual observation of the
home interior represent potentially huge loopholes in the
Fourth Amendment's protection. Unless very narrowly defined,
they are difficult to apply. More importantly, they would allow
police to violate our reasonable expectations of privacy,
whether defined by what we knowingly expose to the public, by
history, by positive law, or by empirical investigation of societal
mores.
The better approach is to designate all house surveillance a
search, but modulate the cause necessary to carry it out. At the
same time, the legislature should ensure that unauthorized use
of technology to view the home never becomes routine by out-
lawing it. Otherwise, our most private sanctuary will become
progressively less private.
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